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This study presents further evidence of the predictability of excess equity 
REIT (real estate investment trust) returns. Recent evidence on forecasting 
excess returns using fundamental variables has resulted in diminishing 
returns from the 1990’s onward. Trading strategies based on these forecasts 
have not significantly outperformed the buy/hold strategy of the 1990’s. We 
have developed an alternative strategy that is based on the time variation of 
the risk premium of investors. Our results indicate that it is possible to 
outperform the buy/hold strategy by modeling the time variation of the risk 
premium. By modeling the dynamic behavior of the risk premium, we are 
able to implicitly capture economic risk premiums that are not captured by 
conventional multi beta asset pricing models. 
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1. Introduction 
 
There has been substantial interest among both practitioners and academics in recent 
years in modeling the predictability of asset returns. Practitioners are interested in 
being able to predict asset returns as this will directly influence their trading 
strategies. Academics are also interested in this area as it has important implications 
in the development of asset pricing models. Evidence from the literature suggests 
that investment strategies based on forecasts of excess returns from fundamental 
variables have produced positive excess returns in the 1970’s and 1980’s. However, 
the performance of these models in the 1990’s has been disappointing. This paper 
adopts an alternative approach and develops strategies based on the time variation of 
the  ex ante risk premium. It begins with a review of the literature on the 
predictability of asset returns, moves on to a discussion of the methodology used, 
presents the outcomes from the analysis, and ends with some conclusions. 
 
 
2. Literature  Review 
 
Historically, two approaches have been used in predicting asset returns, viz., the 
fundamental approach and, secondly, modeling investors’ perceptions of risk through 
the use of time varying risk premiums. The fundamental approach relies on the 
assumption that asset returns are influenced by some common factors that reflect 
different stages of the business cycle. Studies that have adopted this approach in 
relation to stock markets include Chen et al (1986), Conrad and Kaul (1988), Fama 
and French (1990, 1993), Ferson and Harvey (1991), Lo and Mackinley (1992), and 
others. Similar methodologies have been applied to real estate markets. For example, 
studies on the real estate market by Liu and Mei (1992), Liu and Mei (1994), Ling 
and Naranjo (1997), Liu and Mei (1998), Karolyi and Sanders (1998), Quan and 
Titman (1999), and Ling, Naranjo and Ryngaert (2000) have found that economic 
factors conventionally considered important in predicting excess stock returns were 
also important in predicting excess real estate returns. 
 
Variables that were found to be important were the yield on one month treasury bills, 
the yield spread between AAA bond and treasury bills, the dividend yield of the 
stock market, and the cap rate. For the period 1972-1989, Liu and Mei (1992) found 
the excess returns of the equity REITS over the treasury bill rate were predictable 
with R-squares ranging from 14.6% to 16.6%. In a follow-up paper, Liu and Mei 
(1994) demonstrated that significant profits could be generated by forecasting excess 
returns based on the variables described above. 
 
When the excess return was forecast to be positive, a long position was taken in the 
equity REITS. When the forecasted risk premium was negative, a short position was 
taken. This long/short strategy produced significant profits in and out of sample on 
both a non-risk adjusted and a risk adjusted basis. There is also research showing that 
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instance, Li and Wang (1995), using a multifactor asset pricing model that included 
the inflation rate, the growth of industrial production, the term spread, and that 
allowed for time-varying risk premiums, could find no evidence that REIT returns 
were more predictable than the returns of other stocks over the period 1971-1991. 
 
Ling and Naranjo (1997) similarly found evidence to support a commonality of some 
“drivers” for both the real estate and stock markets. They used nonlinear multivariate 
techniques to jointly estimate the risk factor sensitivities and return premiums that 
economic variables such as treasury bills, industrial production, per capita 
consumption, expected and unexpected inflation, etc., had on commercial real estate 
returns. Their analysis was applied to both securitized real estate data as well as to 
“unsmoothed” real estate data from the National Council of Real Estate Investment 
Fiduciaries. Their study showed that the growth rate in real per capita consumption 
and the real treasury bill rate were important economic variables (i.e., consistently 
priced across the four real estate portfolio groups constructed), while the term 
structure and unexpected inflation did not carry statistically significant risk 
premiums in their fixed-coefficient model. 
 
Nelling and Gyourko (1998) studied the predictability of equity REIT returns over 
the period 1975-1995 and found that equity REIT returns were predictable based on 
past performance, but that the predictability was insufficient to cover transaction 
costs. Karolyi and Sanders (1998) examined the variation of economic risk 
premiums by employing a multiple beta asset pricing model and found varying 
degrees of predictability among stocks, bonds, and REITS, concluding that there 
were important economic risk premiums for REITS that were not captured by 
conventional multiple beta asset pricing models. Using a different approach, Cooper 
et al (2000) examined the relationship between systematic price changes and the 
heterogeneity of investor information. They employed a filter-rule methodology to 
determine predictability in returns and found that the predictability of real estate 
returns was generally more indicative of portfolio rebalancing effects. 
 
In a later study on asymmetric risk measures and real estate returns, Cheng (2005) 
examined six asymmetric risk measures and tested their ability to explain cross-
sectional variations in real estate returns. He found that systematic downside risk was 
associated with a risk premium and that skewness, or the lack of statistical symmetry, 
provided significant explanatory power for the variation of cross sectional property 
returns. 
 
In a comparative study on international real estate and stock markets, Liu and Mei 
(1998) found that own country economic state variables (short-interest rates, spread 
between long and short rates, dividend yield), when the exchange rate was adjusted 
for US dollars, accounted for a portion of the variation in the expected rates of return 
in some countries, but not in others. Ling et al (2000) have shown that the extent of 
the predictability of the risk premium was not nearly as great in the 1990’s compared 
to the 1970’s and 1980’s. Using a rolling best fit regression model, they were able to 
produce fairly high results in sample R-squares, but out of sample fits were quite low. Okunev and Wilson     35 
 
With plausible levels of transaction costs, they showed that trading strategies based 
on forecasted risk premiums did not outperform the buy/hold equity REIT strategy in 
the 1990’s. 
 
Recent evidence appears to indicate that forecasting the risk premium based on 
fundamental variables does not perform as well as it did during the 1970’s and 
1980’s. In this paper we adopt a different approach and model the dynamic behavior 
of the ex ante risk premium. From a simple discounted dividend model we extract 
the ex ante risk premium implied from equity REITS. Using this series, we observe 
that when the normalized risk premium is high, this is usually associated with an 
undervaluation of equity REITS. 
 
Conversely, when the normalized risk premium is low, this is usually associated with 
overvalued equity REITS. Our results indicate that when a strategy is based on 
modeling the ex ante normalized risk premium, it is able to significantly outperform 
the buy/hold strategy. By modeling the dynamic behavior of the ex ante risk 
premium, we are implicitly capturing other economic risk premiums that are not 
captured by conventional multi beta asset pricing models (Karolyi and Sanders, 
1998). 
 
 
3.  Data, Methodology and Empirical Results  
 
The study period is from January 1972 to December 2003. All equity REIT data 
were obtained from the National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts data 
library. We note that there are some differences in the number of constituents 
making up the index each year. The yield on treasury bills, the yield on 20 year 
government bonds, and the yield on the Standard &Poor’s 500 were obtained from 
data available on DataStream International, which is licensed annually to the School 
of Finance and Economics at the University of Technology, Sydney, Australia. 
 
3.1.   Descriptive Statistics  
 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the data utilized throughout this paper, 
consisting of total monthly returns (including capital gains and dividends paid) from 
equity REITS, the yield on treasury bills, the yield on 20 year government bonds, 
and the annualized realized risk premium for the equity REITS, which is defined as 
the equity REIT’s total monthly return minus the yield of treasury bills). 
 
Prior studies have raised the issue of a potential structural break in equity REITs. We 
examine this issue by conducting a Zivot and Andrews (1992) test for structural 
breaks. The benefits of using this test are that it reports values for which potential 
breaks occur when they are neither specified nor determined. The importance of 
highlighting where a structural break may occur in the data is that it can have a 
fundamental impact on one of the major test statistics, which will be examined in the 
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regression may produce spurious results as parameter stability becomes questionable 
over the whole sample period or periods straddling the structural break. 
 
 
Table 1  Descriptive Statistics between January 1972 and December 2003 
384 Observations 
Equity 
REITS 
Treasury 
Bill 
Yield 
Twenty 
Year 
Bond 
Yield 
Realized 
Risk 
Premium 
Annualized Mean %   12.7  6.3  8.2  6.4 
Annualized Std. Dev. %   13.5  2.9  2.3  13.6 
 
 
The results of the Zivot and Andrews (1992) test indicate a significant structural 
break for equity REITS occurring at about August 1989. In a recent paper, Glascock 
et al (2000) found evidence of a structural break in 1993, arguing that this might be 
due to changes in tax legislation. We applied the Zivot and Andrews (1992) test to 
the data from 1990 to 2003 and found no evidence of this additional structural break 
at that time. We therefore proceeded on the basis that only one break occurred and 
this was in August 1989. We therefore partitioned the data set into two sub-samples, 
sub-sample one being from January 1972 to August 1989 and sub-sample two from 
September 1989 to December 2003. 
 
The question naturally arises as to what economic event or events may have led to 
the structural break in August 1989, and we suggest two possible reasons from the 
literature. Goetzmann and Wachter (1996), Quan and Titman (1999), and Case et al 
(1999) have provided compelling evidence that real estate returns are highly 
correlated with changes in global and domestic Gross Domestic Products (GDP) and 
that the negative returns of real estate markets in the early 1990’s was due to a global 
recession in 1990. This is especially the case in the United States, where both global 
and local economic factors are important in explaining movements in real estate 
returns (Case et al, 1999). This event may also have been exacerbated by the savings 
and loan crisis, which occurred in 1989 and which resulted in a dramatic shift in the 
financing of real assets. 
 
From the Gordon Shapiro discounted dividend model we extract the implied ex ante 
risk premium from the following equation. 
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where D(t) are dividends paid at time t  
g is the long term annualized growth rate of dividends;  
R(t) is the cost of capital/required rate of return at time t;  
P(t) is the equity REIT price index at time t.  Okunev and Wilson     37 
 
The required rate of return, R(t),  represents the market’s estimate of the return 
required by investors for holding a risky asset. This is a forward-looking estimate 
and may be quite different to past (realized) returns. The ex ante risk premium is 
defined as, EARP(t) = R(t)- TB(t) and represents the excess return/risk premium over 
treasury bills. The ex post risk premium is defined as EPRP(t) = R12(t) – TB(t), in 
which R12(t) is the previous 12 month total return of the equity REITS, and TB(t) is 
the treasury bill rate at time t.  
 
The Gordon Shapiro model requires an estimate of the long-term growth rate of 
dividends. We present two approaches. The first is to use all the data from 1972 to 
2003 and regress the dividend index against time. The slope of this regression is an 
estimate of the long-term growth rate, which in this case was 4.4% per annum. One 
could argue that although g is constant as required by the Gordon Shapiro model, one 
could be criticized for introducing a look-ahead bias into the estimates of the 
required rate of return. For example, in estimating the required rate of return in 
December 1989, investor estimates of the growth rate could only use information 
available at that time. As more information becomes available, the estimate of the 
growth rate may change. To overcome this potential problem, we also estimate the 
growth rate using information only up to time t. This means that as more information 
becomes available, estimates of the growth rate may change. We will examine this 
issue further later in the paper. 
 
It is apparent that the ex ante risk premium is mostly positive and is not nearly as 
volatile as the ex post risk premium. Also note that the ex ante risk premium is 
negative in 1977 and 1981.  
 
The ex ante risk premium is calculated using equation 1 and information that was 
available at time t. Figure 1 displays the ex ante risk premium from January 1977 to 
December 2003. It is apparent that the ex ante risk premium is mostly positive and is 
not nearly as volatile as the ex post risk premium. It is also interesting to note that the 
ex ante risk premium was negative in 1977 and 1981. These results lent some 
support to the findings of Boudoukh et al (1993) that developed tests of inequality 
restrictions implied by conditional asset pricing models. As an application, they 
tested whether the ex ante risk premium was always positive. Using annual data on 
aggregate US stock returns, inflation, long and short rates of interest, and dividend 
yields over three time periods (1802-1990, 1802-1896, and 1897-1990), they 
reported reliable evidence that the ex ante risk premium was negative in some parts 
of the world, with these places being related to periods of high expected inflation and 
especially to a downward sloping term structure. For the period April to August 1981, 
the yield curve was inverted and inflation varied between 8% and 13%. For 1977, the 
yield curve was not inverted, and inflation was 7% per annum.  
 
Liu and Mei (1992), Mei and Liu (1994), Karolyi and Sanders (1998), and Ling et al 
(2000) have shown that variables such as the treasury bill rate, the spread between 
the yields on long term bonds and treasury bills, the dividend yield of the equity 
market and cap rate at time t are able to explain between 20% and 30% of the 38    Predictability of Equity REIT Returns    
 
variation in the realized risk premium from t to t+1. The realized risk premium is 
defined as the monthly return of the equity REITS from t to t+1 minus the treasury 
bill rate at time t. It therefore seems sensible to determine whether these same 
variables can forecast the ex ante risk premium. We adopt an approach which is 
similar to Liu and Mei (1992), where the ex ante risk premium at time t+1  is 
regressed against the following variables: January dummy, treasury bill rate, spread 
between the yield on a long bond and the treasury bill, the dividend yield of equity 
REITs, and the earnings yield of the SP500 at time t. The sample is divided in two. 
The first sub-sample is the in sample period from January 1972 to August 1989; the 
second sub-sample is the out of sample from September 1989 to December 2003. 
 
 
Figure 1   Ex post and Ex ante Risk Premium over Treasury Bills 
 
 
 
The results of the regressions are presented in Table 2. We use generalized least 
squares regression as there was some evidence of serial correlation in the residuals. It 
is evident that fundamental factors cannot explain many of the future movements in 
the ex ante risk premium in either of the sample periods. These results are in stark 
contrast with prior research, which found that fundamental factors explain much the 
movement of the realized risk premium. It appears that movements of the ex ante 
risk premium are not driven by these fundamental factors but are capturing some 
other factors which are influencing equity REIT price movements.  
 
We now investigate whether the dynamic behavior of the ex ante risk premium 
contains information about likely price movements of the equity REITS in the future. 
Figure 2 displays the 36 month rolling normalized ex ante risk premium calculated Okunev and Wilson     39 
 
from the implied growth approach (that is, using information up to time t) relative to 
treasury bills from January 1977 to December 2003. We suggest that when the 
normalized risk premium is high relative to the historic average, investors will 
demand a greater return in holding a risky asset. This is usually associated with 
falling prices. Similarly, when the normalized risk premium is low relative to the 
historic average, investors require a lower return for holding risky assets. This is 
usually associated with rising prices. 
 
 
Table 2   Results of the Ex ante Risk Premium (EARP) against Fundamental 
Factors Using Generalized Least Squares  
 
EARP (t+1) = a+bJandum(t)+cTB(t)+dSP(t)+DY(t)+fEY9t_+e(t) 
 
Depen-
dent 
Var.  Period 
Con-
stant 
Jan 
dum TB  SP DY  EY 
adj 
R
2
 
EARP   1/74-
8/89 
-062 
(-1.58) 
-0.001 
(-0.48) 
-0.0014 
(-0.78) 
-.001 
(-0.58) 
-.006 
(-0.86) 
0.03 
(2.10) 
0.0006 
EARP   9/89-
12/03 
0.065 
(0.45) 
-0.001 
(-0.12) 
0.001 
(0.46) 
.002 
(1.33) 
-.0002 
(-0.04) 
-0.001 
(-0.39) 
0.0003 
 
 
Figure 2   Normalized Ex ante Risk Premium  
 
 
 
Observation of Figure 2 would suggest that in 1980, 1985, 1987, 1992, 1995, 1999, 
and 2001, the equity REITS were oversold (prices depressed) and that the market 40    Predictability of Equity REIT Returns    
 
was overbought in 1977, 1990, 2002, and 2003 (prices inflated). Figure 2 also 
demonstrates that the normalized risk premium is mean reverting and generally 
oscillates between ±2 standard deviations. Large values are usually associated with 
reversals in the next three to six months. 
 
To obtain some insight into the likely future performance of equity REITS, we 
examine the returns when the ex ante risk premium is greater and less than zero. The 
ex ante risk premium can be calculated either by subtracting the treasury bill rate 
from the implied cost of capital or by subtracting the yield on 20 year government 
bonds from the cost of capital. We examine both approaches in the following 
discussion. 
 
Table 3b displays the average return and standard deviation of a number of strategies. 
The strategies examined follow two approaches, each of which is sub-divided into 
another two segments. The two approaches are 1.) the ex ante risk premiums 
calculated from the implied growth model using information up to time t and 2.) the 
constant growth model, which uses all information to estimate the ex ante risk 
premiums. The ex ante risk premiums are then measured relative to long bonds and 
then to s. Specifically, from the implied growth model we have two estimates of the 
ex ante risk premium, one relative to long bonds (IMGRPLB),  the other relative to s 
(IMGRPTB). Similarly, for the constant growth model we have the ex ante risk 
premium relative to long bonds (CGRPLB) and to s (CGRPTB).  
 
It is evident from Table 3b that when the ex ante risk premium was greater than zero, 
the ensuing average return was in the 18% to 19.4% per annum range over the entire 
sample. The returns in the first sub-period were more than 22% per annum, while in 
the second sub-period, returns were in the 13.5% to 17.3% per annum range. On the 
other hand, when the ex ante risk premium was less than zero, the ensuing average 
return was in the range of 2.2% to 4.8% per annum over the entire sample. These 
results confirm our initial assumption that high-risk premiums are usually associated 
with higher subsequent returns, and lower risk premiums with lower subsequent 
returns. 
 
Though there are some differences in returns for the different approaches in 
estimating the ex ante risk premium, these differences are not great. Possibly the 
most effective approach in estimating the ex ante risk premium is using the implied 
growth model relative to s. The question then arises as to how one should invest 
when the ex ante risk premium is less than zero.  
 
Table 4 presents excess returns measured relative to a buy/hold equity REIT 
benchmark for the approaches outlined in table 3. This table presents average excess 
returns (return of the strategy – the equity REIT return) and the standard deviation of 
the excess return. The third row of Table 4 presents the t-values. We also compare 
these results to a forecasting model and show that the performance of the forecasting 
model has produced lower returns than the buy/hold strategies since 1990. Using an 
approach similar to other researchers, we perform a rolling 60 month regression of Okunev and Wilson     41 
 
the realized excess return of the equity REITS from t to t+1 on a lagged variable at 
time t. The lagged variable we adopt is the dividend yield of the equity REITS minus 
the yield on the 20 year government bond. 
 
Table 3a   Acronyms Used in Tables 3b and 4  
 
Acronym Meaning 
IMGRPLB  
IMGRPTB  
CGRPLB  
CGRPTB  
FRP  
Implied Growth Risk Premium Relative to Long Bonds  
Implied Growth Risk Premium Relative to Treasury Bills  
Constant Growth Risk Premium Relative to Long Bonds  
Constant Growth Risk Premium Relative to Treasury Bills  
Forecast Risk Premium  
 
Table 3b   Normalized Ex ante Risk Premium and Returns of Equity REITS 
  
Normalized Risk Premium ≥ 0   1/80- 8/89  9/89 – 12/03  1/80 – 12/03  
Implied Growth  
RP relative to Bonds (IMGRPLB) 
22.2 
(12.5) 
15.2 
(12.8) 
18.3 
(12.5) 
Implied Growth  
RP relative to Tbills (IMGRPTB)  
22.3 
(10.7) 
17.3 
(12.4) 
19.4 
(11.7) 
Constant Growth  
RP relative to Bonds (CGRPLB)  
25.4 
(9.5) 
13.5 
(12.7) 
18.0 
(11.7) 
Constant Growth  
RP relative to Tbills (CGRPTB)  
22.4 
(10.0) 
16.8 
(13.1) 
19.2 
(13.1) 
Normalized Risk Premium < 0  
Implied Growth  
RP relative to Bonds (IMGRPLB) 
-0.1 
(12.0) 
7.0 
(12.1) 
4.5 
(12.0) 
Implied Growth  
RP relative to Tbills (IMGRPTB)  
1.4 
(14.2) 
2.7 
(12.3) 
2.2 
(13.0) 
Constant Growth  
RP relative to Bonds (CGRPLB)  
0.0 
(14.5) 
8.5 
(12.3) 
4.8 
(13.3) 
Constant Growth  
RP relative to Tbills (CGRPTB)  
2.5 
(14.9) 
5.4 
(11.5) 
4.3 
(12.8) 
 
 
Over the whole sample period, all strategies outperformed the buy/hold strategy at 
the 10% level of significance. Using the implied growth measures of the ex ante risk 
premium produced significant excess returns at the 2.5% level of significance. For 
the first sub-period, both the implied growth measures of the ex ante risk premium 
and the forecasting strategy produced significant excess returns at the 10% level. The 42    Predictability of Equity REIT Returns    
 
constant growth ex ante risk premium strategies produced similar excess returns to 
the implied growth strategies. However, the volatility was higher and consequently 
the t-values were lower. For the second sub-period, the only strategy to produce 
significant excess returns was the implied growth strategy, where the ex ante risk 
premium was measured relative to s. Similar to the findings of Ling et al (2000), we 
found that the forecasting strategy which invested in cash/bonds and equity REITS 
underperformed the buy/hold strategy in the 1990’s. It should be noted, however, 
that changes in equity REIT capitalizations that occurred in 1993 may have been 
responsible for the differences in predictability of the strategies in the first vs. the 
second study period and that the break introduced by Glascock et al (2000) was, in 
fact, important despite the outcomes from the Zivot and Andrews (1992) tests used 
in this study. 
 
 
Table 4  Excess Returns over Equity REITS for Differing Strategies 
 
STRATEGY   1/80 – 8/89   9/89 – 12/03  1/80 – 12/03  
IMPGRPLB≥0 relative to bonds  
Annual Excess Return  
Standard Deviation  
t-value  
 
5.8  
10.2  
1.8**  
 
2.6  
9.1  
1.1  
 
3.9  
9.6  
2.0***  
IMPGRPTB≥0 relative to Tbills  
Annual Excess Return  
Standard Deviation  
t-value  
 
5.9  
12.6  
1.5*  
 
4.2  
8.7  
1.8**  
 
4.8  
10.4  
2.3**  
CGRPLB≥0 relative to bonds  
Annual Excess Return  
Standard Deviation  
t-value  
 
4.9  
14.3  
1.1  
 
1.9  
8.6  
0.8  
 
3.1  
11.2  
1.4*  
CGRPTB≥0 relative to Tbills  
Annual Excess Return  
Standard Deviation  
t-value  
 
5.4  
13.8  
1.2  
 
2.5  
8.9  
1.0  
 
3.6  
11.1  
1.6*  
FRP≥0 + BONDS  
Annual Excess Return  
Standard Deviation  
t-value  
 
3.3  
7.5  
1.5*  
 
1.4  
6.6  
0.8  
 
2.0  
6.7  
1.6*  
 
 
The results to date have been quoted without the inclusion of transaction costs. 
However, transaction costs do not play a significant role in relation to ex ante risk 
premium strategies. The strategies are generally slow moving since if, for example, 
one examines Figure 2, it is apparent that in the period 1990-2003, there were only Okunev and Wilson     43 
 
16 trades – just over one per year (a trade occurs every time the normalized ex ante 
risk premium crosses the time axis).  
 
Figure 3 displays the rolling 12 month excess return of the strategy of the implied 
growth ex ante risk premium relative to s. The average excess return was 4.8% per 
annum with a standard deviation of 10.4% per annum. It is evident from figure 3 that 
there may be prolonged periods when the strategy is long in the equity REITS and 
consequently this produces zero excess returns. 
 
 
Figure 3  Implied Growth Ex ante Risk Premium Relative to Treasury Bills 
Rolling 12 Month Excess Returns Average Excess Return = 4.8%, 
Stdev = 10.4% 
 
 
The strategies outlined in this paper may not be suitable for an equity REIT fund 
manager holding only equities (stocks). However, if the portfolio manager holds 
bonds in the portfolio, this strategy may be appropriate in determining tactical shifts 
between equity REITs and bonds. Since changes in exposure may be infrequent, as 
there are periods when positions are not changed for two to three years, the strategy 
is probably better suited to a large balanced portfolio when it comes to making 
decisions about asset allocation. 
 
Because the strategy is slow moving, an asset allocator could increase or decrease 
exposure to equity REITs away from the strategic benchmark allocation to property. 
For example, when the ex ante risk premium ≥0, exposure could be increased to 
equity REITs by directing incoming funds (or reducing exposure to an unattractive 
asset class) to equity REITs. Similarly, when the ex ante risk premium <0, the 44    Predictability of Equity REIT Returns    
 
exposure to equity REITS could be decreased from the benchmark allocation to 
property. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
As pointed out earlier, there has been a great deal of interest in modeling the 
predictability of asset returns. Historically, two approaches have been used in 
predicting asset returns, the fundamental approach and modeling investors’ 
perceptions of risk through the use of time-varying risk premiums. The fundamental 
approach relies on the assumption that asset returns are influenced by some common 
factors that reflect different stages of the business cycle. Strategies based on 
forecasts of excess returns from fundamental variables have produced positive 
excess returns in the 1970’s and 1980’s. However, the performance of these models 
in the 1990’s has been disappointing. We adopt the alternative approach and model 
the time variation of the ex ante risk premium. Variation of the ex ante risk premium 
appears to capture other factors influencing equity REIT price movements, and we 
concur with Karolyi and Sanders (1998) that there are important economic risk 
premiums for equity REITs that are not captured by conventional multiple beta asset 
pricing models. 
 
Returns based on strategies employing the time variation of the ex ante risk premium 
generate positive excess returns. However, the strategies are probably better suited to 
tactical shifts of property asset allocation, owing to the slow movement of the 
indicators of the model. The results for both sample periods suggest that, in the long 
term, strategies based on modeling the time variation of the ex ante risk premium can 
generate significant positive excess returns. 
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